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Janet E. Halley*
My classmates Jim Tourtelott, Joe Sommer, and Eva Saks invented
the  Yale Journal of Law  & the Humanities at  a  Mexican  restaurant
one night in the fall of 1987. When they announced  their idea to me
the next day, my first thought was:  "Great, now there can be a place
to publish  the  things  I want  to write."  How greedy, and  (to say the
same thing in a  different way) how abject! My reaction  reflects not a
sense  of marginality  or  deviance  (both of these  always being  tinged
with  an adventurous  self-confidence  that  was quite  absent from  my
attitude at that moment), but rather a sense of isolation. I could not
have  had  this  bland  reaction  to  the  proposed  oasis  unless  I  had
accepted it as a given  that my  most urgent projects  on the Law  and
Humanities  borderline were mine alone. But the idea of the Journal
swept through the law school and various graduate departments on a
wave  of excitement.  Clearly I had not been alone  and would not be
able to imagine myself as isolated  again.
The particular  sociability  of the Journal in its early days  says
something important, I think, about the Law and Humanities project
more generally. The overt things are somewhat  indicative. We strove
to introduce  some  of the virtues  of humanities  academic  styles  into
legal  publishing.  Law  students  and  graduate  students  in  the
humanities were equally credited members of the editorial team. We
decided  to accept  articles  on the basis  of peer review, to  break the
invasive  editorial  habits  inculcated  by  the  standard  law  reviews  in
favor of respecting our contributors as responsible authors, and to flip
the  standard  law  reviews'  emphasis  on  citation  over  analysis.
Rejecting  a humanities  trend toward  coterie journals, we  decided  to
keep  the Journal open  to  every  approach  to Law  and  Humanities
work  and every political sensibility (and thus not to adopt a title like
the  Yale Journal of Law  & Literature  or the  Yale Journal of Law  &
Culture). 1  Some  of the  things  we  did were  not  inflected  by  either
*  Professor  of Law and  Robert E. Paradise Faculty  Scholar, Stanford Law School.
1.  These  decisions  were  all unequivocally  good  ones, though  I am not sure  how many of
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academic  point of origin. We kicked off the Journal  with  a  panel at
the Modern Language Association meeting in New Orleans convening
Jeff Nunokawa,  Carol  Rose,  and  Patricia  Williams  to  discuss  new
approaches  to  property.  We  disagreed,  angrily  sometimes,  about
whether  the work of  this or that scholar  in our chosen  domain  was
fabulous or tedious. We had amazing  parties.
A more  subtle,  but  more important  part  of the  early  life  of the
Journal  was the strange chemistry between law students and graduate
students. Law students specialize in nothing, decide what to study with
almost  no  interference  from  their  faculty  (a  virtually  riskless  ar-
rangement because their real choices are so narrow), and don't really
know  where  they  want  to  end  up  working.  Graduate  students  are
writing  something big and specialized,  are mentored  and  supervised
sometimes  to  the point of domination  (possibly because  the  choices
across  which  they  are  being professionalized  are  amazingly  broad),
and know exactly the kind of job they want. Graduate students rarely
work  together  on  anything,  almost  never  think  of  themselves  as
problem-solvers, and are apt to say "the law"  as if it were a thing you
could  be  inside  or  outside  of.  Law  students  are  irretrievably
gregarious, love to  show  off their  ability to get  things done, and  (at
Yale  at least)  have  a million ways  of problematizing,  particularizing,
and historicizing  "the  law."
I  have  taught  several interdisciplinary  seminars  at  Stanford  Law
School and have noticed that these differences  can produce  the most
exhilarating  shifts  in  readability  if  things  go  well,  and  the  most
narcissistic,  self-protective  scrambles  for turf and  authority  if  they
don't.  Things  went  well  in  the  first  months  of  the  Journal's life.
Repeatedly the editors approached the differences between them with
respect,  curiosity,  deference,  and  a  hope  that  some  of  the  virtues
might  be  catching. Every time  we  did  so, the euphoria that became
characteristic  of the Journal  was renewed.
I graduated from law school before  the Journal  published  a single
line. My group solicited the first issue, but continuing students saw the
first  manuscripts  into print. Looking  back,  I  think that  the extraor-
dinary  social  moment  that  set the Journal in  motion  requires  some
explanation.  First,  why  was  it  so  unexpectedly  capacitating  for  so
many people?  And second,  why  was it so  euphoric?  What does the
sociability of those first months of the Journal  suggest about the Law
and Humanities  project today?
them have been consistently workable.  We probably made some bad decisions too; I forget what
they were, though  I am sure editors after the inaugural  year can identify  them precisely.
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First, it appears  that the constituency  of the Journal-amorphous,
to be sure, but populous-was dispersed, impassioned,  and already  in
place. Like the explosively well-attended conference sponsored by the
"Working  Group  on Law, Culture, and  the Humanities"  at  George-
town  Law  School  this  spring,  the Journal's birth  revealed  that  an
unexpectedly large number of legal scholars had already decided that
they could not do what  they needed  to do using that would-be  legal-
academic  hegemon,  law  and  economics.  The  remarkable  interest
sparked  by  the  Journal and  the  Georgetown  conference  on  the
humanities  side  of  the  fence  is  a  similar  indication  that  an  un-
foreseeably  large number of scholars there have already decided that
they cannot pursue their distinctive disciplinary  undertakings without
coming to grips  with "the  law,"  not as  a reified  Sublime Command,
but  as  a  dazzlingly  complex  array  of social,  cultural,  linguistic,  and
normative  practices.
Second, it appears that the Law and Humanities project holds  out
the promise  of undoing  a division  induced by an academic structure
that splits law schools off from their universities  as quasi-autonomous
professional  schools. This  division  makes  people  miserable,  I  think,
because  it  underwrites  a  theory/practice  distinction  that  is  both
mistaken  and  intensely  destructive.  In the  name  of this  distinction,
humanities  scholars  disdain  practical  problems  and  the  normative
agon of working  within  currently  binding  constraints.  In  its  name,
legal scholars sneer at scholarly inquiries that take arcane training  to
pursue  and  that  produce  writing  that  is  "hard  to  read."  The  first
months  of  the  Yale  Journal of Law  &  the  Humanities were  ex-
hilarating,  I  think,  precisely  to  the  extent  that  the  editors  simply
suspended these poisonous interactions.
Those  early  editors  opened  the  door  to  scholarship  that  keeps
theory and practice simultaneously in play. The Journal  has published
this  work  consistently  over  its  first decade,  and I  am  certain it  has
"incentivized"-that  is, emboldened people to write-important work
that other publications have actually printed. At its best, this work  is
both  socially, historically, institutionally,  and  normatively  entangled
and  intellectually  self-conscious,  skeptical,  speculative,  and
exploratory. The  door stands open, and I am thankful to ten years of
editors for continuing to hold it ajar.
1998]
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Hendrik Hartog*
It is almost exactly ten years since I was called and  asked if I had
any work I wanted to submit for possible publication in a new journal.
By  odd  coincidence  I  did, and  seven  months later Mrs. Packard on
Dependency appeared  in Volume  1, Issue  1.1  The editors with whom
I spoke claimed  they were not regular-law-review  editor types. They
promised  a light and  respectful editing.  And they kept their word.  I
remember  only  one  cut  on  which  they  insisted.  I  had  described
Elizabeth  Packard  as  an  "Indianapolis"  of nineteenth-century  legal
culture, by which  I meant to place her as a  "site" of importance  only
for  the  roads  (of  thought  and  practice  and  identity)  that  flowed
through her. But I think one of the editors was from Indianapolis and
thought the characterization  a  bit disrespectful  (of Indianapolis, not
of Elizabeth Packard).
Now, a new generation of editors wants me to wax weighty on the
meaning  of the  past decade. And  again  I am compliant. But I  don't
have  a clue where to begin. What does it signify that the Yale Journal
of Law & the Humanities has  come  so  quickly to play  such  a  large
place in the little world  of scholarship that I  inhabit?  What explains
the Journal's  emergence: Our hunger?  (The "our"  of course refers to
those  of  us  who  self-identify  as  Law  and  Humanities  types.)  The
genius  of  successive  editors?  (Of  course.)  Or  is  it  just  one  more
example of the colonizing power of core institutions of American legal
education?  Perhaps  we  should  understand  this  legal-humanistic
enterprise  as akin to a third-rate  colony of the British raj: important
not for material  reasons  (not India in other words),  but to maintain
the  impression that the sun never  sets on  the British Empire.
It does  seem to me that something interesting  has happened  over
the  past twenty  years  or so  to  the  self-consciousness  of those  of us
committed to the Law and Humanities project. Not important, maybe,
because  nothing about  us  ever  is  that, but  interesting  nonetheless.
And  the  success  of  the  Yale  Journal, as  well  as  the  meeting  in
Washington, D.C. in March of this year of the first annual conference
on Law, Culture, and the Humanities, may demarcate  dimensions  of
that change.
That  is,  once  upon  a  time,  to  be  us meant  to know  ourselves  as
sociologically  marginal. There was a core. There was a periphery. We
*  Class  of  1921  Bicentennial  Professor  of  the  History  of  American  Law  and  Liberty,
Princeton  University.
1.  Hendrik  Hartog, Mrs.  Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE  J.L. & HUMAN.  79  (1988).
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were part of the second, never the first. The point is not modesty. In
our  dark  moments,  when  we  wrestled  with  our  grandiosity,  we
imagined that what we did was of earth-shaking importance. Those of
us  who  were  legal  historians, for  example,  knew that  Maitland  and
Hurst  and  E.P  Thompson  (and  and  and)  had set  for  us  models  of
imagination and grandeur that revealed the triviality of the puffed-up
claims,  the  petty  enterprise,  of  those  who  inhabited  the  core  of
academic law. But we also knew, knew deeply, knew as a fundamental
core  of  our being,  that  those  at  the core,  in  the metropole,  would
never  know their own emptiness  and that we would never  be taken
seriously. By them. Who were never  us. They might patronize us, by
hiring  us, for  reasons that had  to do with a  residual need  to appear
academically  respectable  within  a  university. But  they  would  never
understand  what  we did. Or, so  we believed. They  had their way  of
being,  and  of  knowing  law;  we  had  ours.  Theirs  was  coherent,
effective, boring, and powerful.  Ours was tentative, exploratory, and
powerless.  But  also  fun.  In  our  separateness,  we  might  establish
community (I went to my first legal history conference to discover the
odd but shared pleasures  of marginality), but it was always  a deviant
community.
And  there  was  lots  of  evidence  out  there  to  confirm  us  in  our
commitment to our marginality. One  example only: In 1976 1 went to
the law-teaching recruiting convention. At every law school interview
but one, some well-intentioned  faculty  member  asked, with genuine
confusion and friendliness:  Why would you want to teach  something
like legal  history?
But the point is not that we were right. The point is that our beliefs
were  constitutive  of who  we  were:  the  other, not  them. When  we
entered  their  space,  we  did  so  adopting  a  variety  of  stances  that
affirmed  our  separate  identities.  I  know  I  thought  of  myself  as  a
missionary  at various times, as  a counter-irritant,  as a  presence  that
might provide protection  (cover)  for  those  few students  who  might
wish  to  know  themselves  as  "us."  But  there  were  more  moments
when I struggled with myself about who I was. Was I what I was (not
them)  only  because  I  was  inadequate,  unable  to  achieve  a  core
identity? Not smart enough, lacking in cleverness, missing something?
Much has happened. Much has changed. The ordinary methods of
law  study,  the  techniques  of  the  core,  today  include  chunks  of
economics  and history  and political theory and literary  analysis, not
to mention  feminist  theory  and critical  race theory. It  may be,  as  a
result, that  the  core ain't  what  it used  to be, that  the  core  has  lost
some disciplinary power. Perhaps, though I remain skeptical. But for
my purposes here, the more important point is that we, whoever "we"
are, no longer have an identity defined  by our antinomic relationship
1998]
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with  the  core  of  legal  study. Everyone  is  fascinated  by  law  today
(including lots of humanistic scholars  who have  never  entered  a law
school), and disciplinary  barriers no  longer work the way  they once
did. There are now people throughout the university who want to talk
with us, work with us, play with us. We still have  a deep commitment
to our marginality. But it is now a marginality indistinguishable  from
the  marginality  that is the common  lot, the ordinary  experience,  of
academics and scholars. It is  no longer what  it once  was.
And that raises for me a final set of questions. That is, without that
sense of core and periphery, of power and powerlessness, of bad and
good, can we construct  a sense of community for ourselves?  Can we
know  ourselves  as  engaged  in  a  common  pursuit?  Or are we  today
just a  bunch  of individuals  located  in  a variety  of academic  settings,
all  of  whom  have  wildly  varying  interests  in  an  unsettled  and
undomesticated  subject called the law (a subject traditional law study
long struggled to contain)? Is our only source of collective identity the
happenstance  that  all of us  might  conceivably  write  something that
might  appear in the  Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities?
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Richard Weisberg'
I am pleased  indeed to participate  in this  tenth anniversary  issue.
The  field of  Law  and  the Humanities-and,  more  specifically, Law
and Literature-continues  to produce remarkable work. Some of that
work appears  in this Journal  on a regular basis; some appears in Car-
dozo  Studies in Law and Literature, which  also  celebrates  its  tenth
birthday this year. (In yet another tenth anniversary event, the second
edition of  his Law and Literature, Judge  Richard  Posner graciously
salutes the vibrancy and endurance of these two journals,1 while then
replicating  his  unconvincing  and especially  unliterary attacks on the
field more generally.)
In the brief time and  space allotted me for remarks here, I wish to
flag only one change  in Law and Literature notions during these ten
years.  I  believe  that  the  false  dichotomy  between  "theory"  and
"text"-sometimes  stated  as  between  law-as-  and  law-in-
literature-has,  fortunately,  broken  down.  The  narrative  has  been
revealed  as  the source  of the theory. We are reading  stories now or
at least thinking of the ways stories are told; we are less interested in
name-dropping  and  in  making  sure  that  the  Law  and  Literature
enterprise has the mark of the  latest French theoretician.
I  am  serious  in  naming  a  hypothetical  national  origin  for  this
theoretician because  I believe  that there is abroad in the land a post-
postmodernism,  one  that  has  become  skeptical  of  the  absurd
nonreferentiality  and  obscurantist  jargon  of  some  postmodernist
thinkers,  however  marvelous  and  funny  may  otherwise  be  their
approach to language. The focal move is toward  the specificity of his-
tory, and the  most talked-about  event (hitherto avoided  by both the
methods and the aims of most postmodernists)  is the Holocaust. In a
newly  emerging  discourse,  partly originated  by  Law and  Literature
thinkers2  and by storytellers  like  Camus  and filmmakers  like  Alain
Resnais and  Louis Malle, the sad  events of Vichy France  have  been
foregrounded.  The  Vichy model,  unlike  that of the Third  Reich, to
which admirable postmodernists like Geoffrey Hartman had previous-
ly directed their concern, indicates  that complexity of discourse  and
a kind of deconstructive  flexibility with the egalitarian metanarrative
*  Walter  Floersheimer  Professor of  Constitutional Law,  Benjamin  N.  Cardozo  School of
Law.
1.  See RICHARD  A. POSNER,  LAW  AND  LITFERATURE  at  vii (rev.  ed. 1998).
2.  See,  e.g.,  GEOFFREY  HARTMAN,  THE  LONGEST  SHADOW  73-74  (1996)  (referring  to
RICHARD  WEISBERG,  Legal Rhetoric Under Stress: The Example of Vichy,  in POETHICS, AND
OTHER  STRATEGIES  OF LAW  AND  LITERATURE  143  (1992)  [hereinafter  POETHICS]).
19981
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of French constitutionalism  contributed  more than  did  simplistic  or
idealistic rhetoric to  the doing of evil during  the Holocaust.  Stories,
it might  be  said,  particularly  Camus's  The Fall, 3  laid  down  a  more
appropriate  postmodernist strategy of speaking  and reading  than we
find, say, in Derrida.
Our discourse,  to put it simply, is  becoming more historical, more
specific,  more  ethical.  Law  and  Literature  is  a  "naming"  interdis-
cipline,  not one  largely  designed  to  reify the  everywhere  otherwise
situated  discourse  of  antifoundationalism.  Yet  the  stakes  for  our
culture and our beliefs are far greater than have been apparent in the
postmodernist  turn. And  this is because  an  emphasis  on text rather
than  theory-on  naming  rather  than  unnaming-coerces  choices.
What  kind of law  do we  want,  and based  on what kinds  of values?
What  lessons, some  of  them  potentially  specific,  will  we  learn  from
the  sad  event  that marks  the end-Camus's  Fall-of the ensconced
narratives of European culture? To what alternative models might we
now turn?
Law  and  Literature,  partly  through  an empirically  demonstrable
move  in the recent year or two to religion, will  be the primary force
in formulating a discussion of these millennial issues. (Perhaps this is
why I understood him-where perhaps in the past I have not4-when
James  Boyd  White  recently  agreed  to write  "about  religion"  even
though  he was hardly  an expert  on it-who is?-and  admitted  "the
enormous  difficulty  of talking about  religion in the  language  of the
law."' )  Here  again,  stories, not  all  of them  Biblical,  will  anticipate
theory.
For  me,  the  question  will  be  a  hermeneutic  one:  Which  value
system  or systems  will likely  lead to just ways of reading  and doing
the  law, and  which ones  will  not?  My  sources  will  be  not only  the
narratives of the tragic history of what has passed for law during our
century  in  places  like  Vichy, Nazi  Germany, the  Soviet  Union,  and
South Africa, among other places; but also the marvelous  iconoclasm
of Nietzsche  and the brilliant postwar accounts of Giinter Grass. But
these  are my  sources. Law and  Literature  eschews enforcing  simple
answers or directed bibliographies  on its practitioners.
It is freedom within such a challenging and aspirational structure of
discourse  that  keeps  Law  and  Literature  alive  and  well.  May  this
3.  ALBERT CAMus,  THE  FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books  1956)  (1956).
4.  See RICHARD  WEISBERG,  Notes on Three  Works by  James Boyd White, in POETHICS,
supra note  2,  at 224.
5.  James Boyd White,  Talking About Religion in the Language of the Law: Impossible but
Necessary, 81  MARQ.  L. REV.  177,  177  (1998).
396
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Journal  continue  to play a key role in the growth of our still-fledgling
but demonstrably  precious  organism.
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James Boyd  White*
The tenth  anniversary  of this Journal  is  an  occasion  not  only  for
celebrating  its remarkable  achievements, but also for thinking  again
about  the nature  and  premises  of the  work  it reflects.  One  way  to
begin might be with its two central terms, "law"  and "humanities"  (or
the obvious alternative to the second,  "literature").
"Law"  is a term we  lawyers  think  we  understand  clearly enough,
but those who are not trained  as we  are puzzle a good  deal over the
word,  and not without reason. Does it mean  a  set  of rules, a  set of
authoritative  texts, certain  modes  of interpretation,  a forum  for  the
resolution  of  conflicts,  a  way  of  carrying  on  disputes,  a  set  of
techniques  of argument  or  analysis,  a  cluster  of institutions  in  the
world, the instrument for the expression of political power, or what?
The law is all of the above  and more, we say: At its center, it is a set
of intellectual and social practices, defined and taught by a community
of lawyers, professors, and judges. It  is in  this sense like  a language.
And these practices, like those of any language, are in the process  of
their  own  revision, which  means that  what  the  lawyer learns  is  not
only  certain  modes  of  thought  and  expression,  but  ways  of plying
them to  particular  situations, appropriating  them to his or her own
mind,  and  in  the process  transforming  them.  This  is  what  we  teach
and  what we  learn;  it  is  because  it is  so  complex  and  uncertain,  so
alive  and full  of surprise, that law  is so  interesting, and it is for the
same reason that it has the power, endurance,  and value that it does
as a social and ethical institution.
When  I  studied  law,  perhaps  more  than  is  the  case  now,  legal
practices  were  seen  as  discrete,  with  an  ethical  and  aesthetic  sig-
nificance  of their  own. The  law was not "autonomous,"  in the sense
of existing independently  from  every  other cultural  form, but  it did
have a distinctive identity and role, and we knew it could not simply
be collapsed into other forces, genres, or practices. As an activity that
transforms the material of life into another form, with a different kind
of meaning, it has  the essential characteristics  of an art.
How  about  "humanities"  or  "literature"?  I  will  begin  with  the
second  and perhaps  more  modest  term,  which  presents  difficulties
comparable to "law."  The main danger of "literature"  is that it seems
to invoke  a canon  of high literature  embodying  a  certain set of old-
fashioned  social  and  political  views.  But  thinking  of  my  own  ex-
*  L. Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of Classical
Studies, University of Michigan.
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perience when  I was working  on  The Legal Imagination 1  more than
twenty-five  years ago, I did not think of the literature I invoked  as a
fixed set of texts, and certainly not one that taught a certain morality
or politics. For me  "literature"  was really  a set  of questions, learned
partly from my reading, partly from my teachers, questions one could
bring to virtually any text. Some texts rewarded  this kind of attention
wonderfully, others much less so; the former were "literary,"  but the
difference  was not much  related  to whether  the particular  text  had
been  "canonized."  The questions  that the word  "literature"  defined
were  practices, in this  a bit like law;  and their true object was not a
set  of  sacred  objects,  but  life  itself:  the  world  of  language  and
expression  and  meaning in which we  constantly live.
What  I  think  of  as  literary  questions  were  of  two  general  sorts,
which I will call  "ethical"  and "intellectual."  The first begins with the
speaker:  Who is  speaking  here, in  what dramatic  situation,  in what
tones  of voice,  to whom, and  with what effect?  Is this an admirable
definition of self and other, one that the reader might wish to imitate
or appropriate, or not?  This kind of reading  is a training  of the ear,
and its most important application is not to one's reading, but to one's
own writing:  Who am I here, using what tones of voice, speaking to
whom, and  with what  effect?  There  are lots  of negative  possibilities
against which to be on guard, and it is difficult to define positive ones.
The second set of questions  has to do with the  language  used, its
force and implication, and the kind of relation the speaker establishes
with  it. Do you simply replicate  your forms of speech, speaking just
as others do, or do you find a way to make them your own, and if so,
do you do so in a good or a bad way?  What are the  forms or genres
with which you work,  and what  are their significances?  How do you
give meaning  to your terms, as they are used relative  to each other?
Here  language  becomes  continuous  with  culture  and  the  question
arises  how far  one's mind  is  made  by its  inheritance;  how far-and
how-it can  remake it.
Speaking  of  my  own  experience,  then,  when  I  turned  to
"literature,"  it  was  not to  a  public Western  canon,  but to  a  set  of
questions,  a  set  of  practices,  which  could  be  brought  to  any  text.
Hence  the  appearance,  in my  early  book,  of  passages  from  Emily
Post, Prison Rules, Fowler's Modern English Usage, and so on. And
in  my view, the  most important texts to which these  questions were
to be brought were those produced by the student, and by me, in class
1.  JAMES  B.  WHITE,  THE  LEGAL  IMAGINATION:  STUDIES  IN  THE  NATURE  OF  LEGAL
THOUGHT  AND  EXPRESSION  (1973).
1998]
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and in the rest of life. "Literature"  is in the end not a matter of high
culture, but of  a certain kind of attention to human expressions.
"Humanities"  is obviously a  much broader term than  "literature,"
and presents  a different danger: that it will invoke a set of established
disciplines, such as art history, classics, philosophy, music, architecture,
and so on; and all as if they were entities that the law could somehow
incorporate  or  in  some  unproblematic  way  learn  from.  There  is  a
related risk that one will think that the academic fields are more real
or important  than  the  painting  or  architecture  or  music  itself;  the
method  more  important  than  the  material  of  study.  Actually,  the
lawyer can and should direct attention both to the primary works of
expression and to the ways of reading them that characterize different
disciplines. With respect to the latter, the task is to establish relations
between  distinctive  communities  of  discourse;  with  respect  to  the
former, it is to find a way to talk about works whose expressive action
has already  been completed.  As I have elsewhere argued,  both tasks
present a problem of translation, in facing which one must address the
differences,  in  some  sense  unbridgeable  differences,  between
languages,  between  forms  of expression,  and between  cultures  and
selves.
On the other hand, there are unifying questions or themes running
through the  primary  works  and the  disciplines  too. Though  I  know
this  is  a contested  position,  for  me  the  key element  that  unites  the
humanities-it  is  at work in a  pronounced  way in "literature "-is  a
shared interest in meaning: the meaning of what we say, the meaning
of  our  languages  and  what  we  do  with  them,  the  meaning  of  the
relations we establish with each other through language. Of course we
live  in  a  material  universe,  but  it  is  not  self-interpreting  or  self-
signifying,  and neither is our social world. The question  at the center
of the  humanities,  then,  is  what  this  artifact  or that-this poem  or
temple  or sonata or novel or ritual or  linguistic pattern-should  be
taken  to mean. This is also  the  central question  of law, beyond  the
immediate  issue  of  rule  or  result:  What  does  it  mean  that  this
happened, or that, or that we  decide the case this way or that? That
is the deepest question for the judge, and for the lawyer too, for it is
at  the  center  of his  argument:  "If  you decide  this way  it will  mean
In  both  the  law  and  the  humanities  we  are  constantly  asking
questions  of meaning, yet without  knowing  fully what we  are  doing
when  we do so. It is with this question-what we are doing when we
ask questions  of meaning-that  our future work  might  best concern
itself, both in our writing and in our teaching.
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